CyberRota Analysis
AI-GeneratedMojoX::Authentication versions prior to 0.006 for Perl are vulnerable to SAML authentication bypass due to improper handling of trust anchors in the parse_assertion function. This flaw allows an attacker to exploit the SAML login process by posting a response signed with their own certificate, enabling unauthorized authentication of any NameID included in the response. Organizations using affected versions of MojoX::Authentication should prioritize remediation to prevent potential unauthorized access to their systems.
Original NVD Description
MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass because parse_assertion builds Net::SAML2::Binding::POST without a trust anchor. parse_assertion in MojoX::Authentication::Model::SAML2 calls Net::SAML2::Binding::POST->new with no cacert, cert_text or anchors argument, then passes the returned XML to Net::SAML2::Protocol::Assertion->new_from_xml with the IdP signing certificate as cacert. In Net::SAML2 before 0.86 that certificate guards only encrypted assertions, so the signature on an unencrypted assertion is checked against the certificate the response itself carries. An attacker starts a SAML login, then posts a response signed with a certificate of their own. The audience, InResponseTo and timestamp checks that follow are all satisfiable by the attacker, so the response authenticates any NameID it carries.