OCTOBER 13, 2026
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Case File

CVE-2026-82723

LOW · CVSS 1.8 EPSS 0.18% Public Exploit

Source: NVD + CISA KEV + EPSS · Published 2026-09-17 · Last synced 2026-10-13

CyberRota Analysis

AI-Generated

The vulnerability in AshAuthentication allows sensitive user password digests to be disclosed in audit logs, as the system logs the actor's user record, including the hashed password, without proper filtering. While exploitation requires access to the audit store, such as through database credentials or roles, the potential for offline password attacks against active accounts makes this a concern for organizations using affected versions of ash_authentication (4.12.0 to 4.15.0 and 5.0.0-rc.0 to 5.0.0-rc.2). Organizations should prioritize remediation if they have access controls that could allow unauthorized reading of audit logs.

Public Exploit Signal

A public exploit, PoC, GitHub repository or Metasploit reference was detected for this CVE.

Detected Signals
exploit

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CVE
CVE-2026-82723
Severity
LOW
CVSS
1.8
EPSS
0.18%

Original NVD Description

Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows disclosure of user password digests to readers of the audit store. The audit_log add-on builds each entry's extra_data in AshAuthentication.AddOn.AuditLog.Auditor.build_extra_data/4, which takes :actor from the action callback context verbatim. Any audited action invoked with actor: set to a user record therefore deposits that record, including its hashed_password attribute, into the audit entry. The same module already collapses the audited identity to an opaque string via AshAuthentication.user_to_subject/1 and filters params against the strategy's configured allow-list, so the actor is the only stored value that reaches the audit store unfiltered. Marking the attribute sensitive?: true does not help, because that redacts inspect/1 output rather than JSON encoding or raw-term storage. There is no attacker-controlled trigger and no network disclosure path: entries accumulate from ordinary authenticated activity, and an attacker's own requests deposit only their own digest. Exploitation requires independent read access to the audit store, such as database credentials, an audit role, a backup, or a log shipper, at which point the digests support offline password attack against every active account. Whether the material persists depends on the data layer, since raw-term stores keep it verbatim while a SQL store raises Protocol.UndefinedError and drops the entry unless the user resource derives Jason.Encoder. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.12.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.2.