CyberRota Analysis
AI-GeneratedThe vulnerability in the AshAI tool allows unauthorized users to bypass access controls, enabling them to update or delete records without proper identification, potentially affecting all records in the database. This flaw arises from the improper handling of user-controlled input in the update and destroy operations, which can lead to arbitrary data manipulation. Organizations using ash_ai versions from 0.6.0 to just before 1.0.0 should prioritize patching this issue to safeguard their data integrity and prevent unauthorized access.
Public Exploit Signal
A public exploit, PoC, GitHub repository or Metasploit reference was detected for this CVE.
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Original NVD Description
Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_ai allows a caller of an identity-configured tool to update or destroy records it never identified, including every row in the table. In AshAi.Tool.Execution, identity_filter/3 built the update/destroy filter directly from the raw tool arguments as [{key, Map.get(arguments, to_string(key))}] and passed it to Ash.Query.do_filter/2. A map value is parsed as a predicate expression rather than a literal, so a caller can send {"public_ref": {"not_eq": "<own-ref>"}} and, combined with Ash.Query.limit(1) and Ash.bulk_update!/Ash.bulk_destroy!, retarget the write at a record it never identified; an omitted key yields an IS NULL filter that matches an arbitrary row. The fix casts each identity value to the field type, rejecting non-scalar inputs. This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.6.0 before 1.0.0.