CyberRota Analysis
AI-GeneratedThe vulnerability affects the miniOrange SAML SSO extensions for Joomla, allowing unauthenticated attackers to bypass authentication and log in as any existing user, including administrators. This is due to improper handling of signature verification in the mo_saml_validate_signature() function, which incorrectly treats an error return value from OpenSSL as a valid signature. Organizations using affected versions of these extensions should prioritize immediate patching to mitigate the risk of unauthorized access.
Original NVD Description
Joomla Extension - miniorange.com - Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass via SAMLResponse Parameter in miniOrange SAML SSO < 11.0.2, SAML SP Single Sign On – Login with ADFS < 6.4, SAML SP Single Sign On – SAML SSO login with Google Apps < 6.4 - This is due to the mo_saml_validate_signature() function performing a loose boolean check on the raw tri-state integer returned by PHP's openssl_verify(), causing an error return value of -1 to be evaluated as truthy and therefore treated as a successful signature verification. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in as any existing Joomla user, including administrators, by submitting a crafted SAMLResponse containing an attacker-controlled NameID and a deliberately malformed signature value that triggers an OpenSSL processing error — bypassing verification entirely and resulting in wp_set_auth_cookie() being called for the targeted account.