CyberRota Analysis
AI-GeneratedThe Proxy Helper's `proxy()` function in versions 4.7.0 to 4.12.33 of the Hono web application framework fails to properly remove certain response headers specified by the origin's Connection header, potentially exposing sensitive connection-scoped metadata to clients. This vulnerability could lead to unintended information disclosure when applications proxy responses from origins that include non-standard headers. Developers and system administrators using affected versions should prioritize upgrading to version 4.12.34 to mitigate this risk.
Public Exploit Signal
A public exploit, PoC, GitHub repository or Metasploit reference was detected for this CVE.
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Original NVD Description
Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. From 4.7.0 to 4.12.33, the Proxy Helper proxy() function in hono/proxy does not remove response headers named by the origin's Connection header. Per RFC 9110 Section 7.6.1, an intermediary must remove the header fields listed in a message's Connection header field before forwarding the message, in addition to the well known hop by hop headers, but the proxy() function only removed the well known hop by hop headers, including Connection itself, from origin responses. A client may therefore receive response headers that the origin intended only for its immediate peer, disclosing connection scoped or internal metadata contained in such headers, when an application proxies responses from an origin that declares additional, non standard headers as hop by hop via the Connection response header. This issue is fixed in version 4.12.34.