CyberRota Analysis
AI-GeneratedThe wicked DHCPv4 client is vulnerable due to an integer underflow in its packet capture code, which fails to properly validate the IP total length against the IP header length. An unauthenticated attacker on the same network can exploit this flaw to cause an out-of-bounds read, potentially crashing the daemon. Organizations using wicked versions up to 0.6.80 should prioritize patching this vulnerability to mitigate the risk of service disruption.
Public Exploit Signal
A public exploit, PoC, GitHub repository or Metasploit reference was detected for this CVE.
Note: these links are listed for security research and verification purposes only.
Original NVD Description
An integer underflow was found in the DHCPv4 packet capture code of wicked. ni_capture_inspect_udp_header() in src/capture.c does not verify that the IP total length field (ip_len) is at least as large as the IP header length (ihl) before subtracting the header length. An unauthenticated attacker on the same network can thereby trigger an out-of-bounds read past the receive buffer in the wicked DHCPv4 client (wickedd-dhcp4), which can crash the daemon depending on the process memory layout. No information disclosure has been demonstrated. This issue affects wicked up to and including version 0.6.80.