CyberRota Analysis
AI-GeneratedThe vulnerability lies in Memos' webhook dispatch function, which improperly handles DNS resolution by using the original hostname instead of the validated IP address when establishing a connection. This flaw allows an attacker with control over the DNS for the webhook's hostname to exploit a time-of-check/time-of-use scenario, potentially leading to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks. Organizations utilizing Memos' webhook functionality should prioritize addressing this vulnerability to mitigate the risk of unauthorized access to internal resources.
Public Exploit Signal
A public exploit, PoC, GitHub repository or Metasploit reference was detected for this CVE.
Note: these links are listed for security research and verification purposes only.
Original NVD Description
Memos' webhook dispatch function safeDialContext (internal/webhook/webhook.go) resolves the target hostname via net.DefaultResolver.LookupHost and validates the resulting IPs against reserved ranges, but then dials net.JoinHostPort(host, port) using the original hostname rather than the already-validated IP address.