OCTOBER 9, 2026
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Case File

CVE-2026-67409

MEDIUM · CVSS 6.5 EPSS 0.49% Public Exploit

Source: NVD + CISA KEV + EPSS · Published 2026-09-25 · Last synced 2026-10-09

CyberRota Analysis

AI-Generated

RabbitMQ versions from 3.13.0 to 4.3.3, including several earlier versions, are vulnerable due to a flaw in the JWKS key fetching mechanism that fails to validate HTTP response status codes when retrieving signing keys. This oversight can lead to a persistent denial of service for all OAuth2/JWT authentication if a non-200 response is received, effectively allowing an attacker to disrupt access for all legitimate users. Organizations using affected RabbitMQ versions should prioritize updating to the patched releases to mitigate this high-severity vulnerability.

Public Exploit Signal

A public exploit, PoC, GitHub repository or Metasploit reference was detected for this CVE.

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CVE
CVE-2026-67409
Severity
MEDIUM
CVSS
6.5
EPSS
0.49%

Original NVD Description

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 4.3.3, 4.2.9, 4.1.14, 4.0.23, and 3.13.18, JWKS Fetch Ignores HTTP Response Status Code - Signing Key Destruction Causes Authentication DoS (CWE-252). the JWKS key fetching mechanism in uaajwt.erl does not validate the HTTP response status code when downloading signing keys from the OAuth2 provider's JWKS endpoint. Non-200 responses (including 4xx and 5xx errors) are processed identically to successful responses. When the JWKS endpoint returns an error response with a valid-JSON body that lacks a keys field, all previously cached signing keys are destroyed, causing a persistent authentication denial of Files: deps/rabbitmqauthbackendoauth2/src/uaajwt.erl, lines 50-63 deps/rabbitmqauthbackendoauth2/src/uaajwks.erl, lines 5-7 deps/rabbitmqauthbackendoauth2/src/rabbitoauth2provider.erl, lines 98-107 Bug 1: HTTP status code ignored (uaajwt.erl:50-63): The Erlang httpc module returns {ok, {{HttpVersion, StatusCode, ReasonPhrase}, Headers, Body}}. The pattern {ok, {, , JwksBody}} matches ANY successful HTTP transaction Persistent authentication DoS: Once keys are destroyed, ALL OAuth2/JWT authentication fails for all users until a new successful JWKS refresh occurs Amplification: A single attacker can deny access to all legitimate OAuth2 users across the entire RabbitMQ. This issue is fixed in versions 4.3.3, 4.2.9, 4.1.14, 4.0.23, and 3.13.18.

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