AUGUST 14, 2026
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Case File

CVE-2026-66884

LOW · CVSS 2.1 EPSS 0.21% Public Exploit

Source: NVD + CISA KEV + EPSS · Published 2026-08-04 · Last synced 2026-08-14

CyberRota Analysis

AI-Generated

A Cross-Site Request Forgery vulnerability in the Oidcc.Plug.AuthorizationCallback module of the Erlang Ecosystem Foundation's oidcc_plug library allows attackers to exploit the absence of session checks, enabling unauthorized actions on behalf of victims. This flaw can lead to account takeover, particularly for applications that reuse callback endpoints for both signing in and linking provider accounts. Developers using oidcc_plug versions from 0.2.0-beta.1 to before 0.5.0 should prioritize patching this vulnerability to mitigate the risk of unauthorized access and data exposure.

Public Exploit Signal

A public exploit, PoC, GitHub repository or Metasploit reference was detected for this CVE.

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CVE
CVE-2026-66884
Severity
LOW
CVSS
2.1
EPSS
0.21%

Original NVD Description

Cross-Site Request Forgery vulnerability in Erlang Ecosystem Foundation oidcc_plug (Oidcc.Plug.AuthorizationCallback module) allows an attacker to make a victim's browser complete an authorization flow the victim never initiated. This vulnerability is associated with program file lib/oidcc/plug/authorization_callback.ex and program routine Oidcc.Plug.AuthorizationCallback.call/2. A callback request that carries no Oidcc.Plug.Authorize session is processed with every security check disabled rather than being rejected. call/2 substitutes permissive defaults for the absent session, and each downstream check treats its value as nothing to compare and returns :ok, so the nonce, state, PKCE, peer IP and user agent checks are all skipped. A separate clause of check_state/2 also accepts a state-less request when a verifier is present. An attacker obtains an authorization code for their own provider account, then induces the victim to visit the callback endpoint with that code and no state parameter. The application signs the victim in as the attacker, so the victim's subsequent actions occur in the attacker's account where the attacker can read them. Applications reusing one callback for both signing in and linking a provider account are further exposed to account takeover, the attacker's account becoming linked to the victim's. The permissive fallback serves no conforming flow. Third-party-initiated login reaches a relying party at a separate login initiation endpoint and causes it to send a fresh authentication request, and this library implements no such endpoint. Oidcc.Plug.Authorize always sends a state parameter, which an authorization server must echo, so no legitimate callback lacks one. This issue affects oidcc_plug: from 0.2.0-beta.1 before 0.5.0.