AUGUST 4, 2026
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Case File

CVE-2026-64564

UNKNOWN · CVSS N/A EPSS 0.16%

Source: NVD + CISA KEV + EPSS · Published 2026-08-04 · Last synced 2026-08-04

CyberRota Analysis

AI-Generated

The vulnerability in the Linux kernel affects the SCTP (Stream Control Transmission Protocol) implementation, specifically in the handling of ASCONF (Address Configuration) messages, where a transport can be incorrectly freed during DEL-IP processing. This flaw allows an attacker to exploit a dangling pointer, potentially leading to memory corruption and denial of service by manipulating transport associations. System administrators and developers managing Linux-based systems utilizing SCTP should prioritize patching this vulnerability to mitigate risks associated with memory safety and service availability.

CVE
CVE-2026-64564
Severity
UNKNOWN
CVSS
N/A
EPSS
0.16%
Linux

Original NVD Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: don't free the ASCONF's own transport in DEL-IP processing sctp_process_asconf() caches the transport the ASCONF chunk is processed against in asconf->transport (== chunk->transport, set once in sctp_rcv()). For an ASCONF located through its Address Parameter by __sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup(), that cached transport corresponds to the Address Parameter, which need not be the packet's source address. sctp_process_asconf_param() rejects a DEL-IP for the packet source address (ADDIP D8, SCTP_ERROR_DEL_SRC_IP), but nothing protects asconf->transport. A single ASCONF can therefore carry, in order: [Address Parameter L] [DEL-IP L] [DEL-IP 0.0.0.0] where L differs from the source. The DEL-IP for L passes the D8 check and calls sctp_assoc_rm_peer() on the transport that asconf->transport still points at, freeing it (RCU-deferred). The following wildcard DEL-IP then reuses the now-dangling asconf->transport in sctp_assoc_set_primary() and sctp_assoc_del_nonprimary_peers(): set_primary() dereferences the freed transport (->ipaddr, ->state) and plants the dangling pointer into asoc->peer.primary_path / active_path, and del_nonprimary_peers(), keeping only the pointer that is no longer on the list, removes every real transport, leaving the association with a transport_count of 0 and primary_path/active_path pointing at freed memory. Reject a DEL-IP that targets the transport the ASCONF is being processed against, mirroring the existing source-address guard, so the wildcard branch can never reuse a freed transport.