CyberRota Analysis
AI-GeneratedA vulnerability in the Linux kernel's USB Type-C UCSI implementation allows a root user to trigger a crash by placing a specially crafted firmware file in the /lib/firmware directory, which lacks a required ':' record header. This flaw can lead to a system crash due to improper handling of NULL pointers during firmware processing. System administrators and security teams managing Linux environments should prioritize addressing this issue to prevent potential denial-of-service conditions.
Original NVD Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: ucsi: ccg: reject firmware images without a ':' record header do_flash() locates the first .cyacd record with p = strnchr(fw->data, fw->size, ':'); while (p < eof) { s = strnchr(p + 1, eof - p - 1, ':'); ... } If the firmware image contains no ':' byte, strnchr() returns NULL. NULL compares less than the valid kernel pointer eof, so the loop body runs and strnchr() is called with p + 1 == (void *)1 and a length of roughly (unsigned long)eof, causing a wonderful crash. The not_signed_fw fallthrough earlier in do_flash() and the chip-state branches in ccg_fw_update_needed() allow an unsigned blob to reach this loop, so a root user who can place a crafted file under /lib/firmware and write the do_flash sysfs attribute can trigger the oops. Bail out with -EINVAL when the initial strnchr() returns NULL.