CyberRota Analysis
AI-GeneratedThe vulnerability affects the Linux kernel's Thunderbolt property handling, specifically in the `__tb_property_parse_dir()` function, which improperly processes `dir_len` values less than 4, leading to potential out-of-bounds memory access and size_t underflow. This could result in kernel crashes or unauthorized memory access, posing a significant risk to system stability and security. Linux administrators and developers managing systems with Thunderbolt support should prioritize applying the relevant patches to mitigate these risks.
Original NVD Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: thunderbolt: property: Reject dir_len < 4 to prevent size_t underflow On the non-root path, __tb_property_parse_dir() takes dir_len from entry->length (u16 widened to size_t). Two distinct OOB conditions follow when entry->length < 4: 1. The non-root path begins with kmemdup(&block[dir_offset], sizeof(*dir->uuid), ...) which always reads 4 dwords from dir_offset. tb_property_entry_valid() only enforces dir_offset + entry->length <= block_len, so a crafted entry with dir_offset close to the end of the property block and entry->length in 0..3 passes that gate but lets the UUID copy run off the block (e.g. dir_offset = 497, dir_len = 3 in a 500-dword block reads block[497..501]). 2. After the kmemdup, content_len = dir_len - 4 underflows size_t to ~SIZE_MAX, nentries becomes SIZE_MAX / 4, and the entry walk runs OOB on each iteration until an entry fails validation or the kernel oopses on an unmapped page. Reject dir_len < 4 on the non-root path *before* the UUID kmemdup, which closes both holes. Also move INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dir->properties) up to immediately after the dir allocation so the new error-return path (and the existing uuid-alloc failure path) calling tb_property_free_dir() sees a walkable list rather than the zero-initialized NULL next/prev that list_for_each_entry_safe() would oops on.