CyberRota Analysis
AI-GeneratedThe vulnerability affects the Dragonfly open-source P2P file distribution system, where an unauthenticated gRPC flow allows attackers to manipulate PeerHost.Ip and PeerHost.DownPort values, leading to server-side request forgery (SSRF) attacks. This flaw enables attackers to probe internal services by crafting HTTP GET requests without proper destination validation, potentially exposing sensitive information from loopback and private services. Organizations using versions prior to 2.4.4-rc.3 should prioritize remediation to mitigate the risk of unauthorized access to internal resources.
Public Exploit Signal
A public exploit, PoC, GitHub repository or Metasploit reference was detected for this CVE.
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Original NVD Description
Dragonfly is an open source P2P-based file distribution and image acceleration system. Prior to 2.4.4-rc.3, the scheduler's default unauthenticated v1 gRPC flow accepts attacker-controlled PeerHost.Ip and PeerHost.DownPort values through RegisterPeerTask and ReportPeerResult, storeHost copies those values into resource.Host, and handlePeerSuccess invokes Peer.DownloadTinyFile() for a TINY task. DownloadTinyFile() in scheduler/resource/standard/peer.go builds an HTTP GET request from the supplied address without destination validation, allowing a remote attacker to probe loopback, link-local, and private services and place up to TinyFileSize, 128 bytes, of a response in Task.DirectPiece for later retrieval. PeerHost.DownPort is restricted to ports 1024 through 65534, and the issue provides read SSRF rather than remote code execution. The remediation blocks loopback and link-local targets, while RFC1918 destinations remain reachable because IsGlobalUnicast accepts private ranges. This issue is fixed in 2.4.4-rc.3.