CyberRota Analysis
AI-GeneratedZebra nodes prior to version 4.5.0 are vulnerable to a consensus issue that can cause them to permanently halt when processing a specially crafted block containing a long chain of transparent self-spends to a single address. This vulnerability arises from a flawed credit-first output application order, which can lead to an intermediate balance exceeding the maximum limit, triggering a panic condition. Operators of Zebra nodes should prioritize upgrading to version 4.5.0 to mitigate this risk and ensure continuous operation.
Public Exploit Signal
A public exploit, PoC, GitHub repository or Metasploit reference was detected for this CVE.
Note: these links are listed for security research and verification purposes only.
Original NVD Description
ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a consensus-valid block containing a long chain of transparent self-spends to one address can permanently halt Zebra nodes. In zebra-state/src/service/finalized_state/zebra_db/transparent.rs, the finalized-state writer originally applied every newly created output as a credit before applying any spent-output debit from the same block. That credit-first ordering can make the intermediate per-address balance exceed MAX_MONEY even though the final net balance is valid, causing an expect-based panic under the panic equals abort release profile. Because zcashd accepts the triggering block and Zebra encounters it again after every restart, the halt persists until patched software is deployed; exploitation requires mining the specially constructed block and temporarily committing sufficient ZEC to the self-spend chain. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.