CyberRota Analysis
AI-GeneratedThe vulnerability in free5GC affects the validation of user identifiers in the UDR component, allowing an attacker with network access to submit non-3GPP identifiers that bypass validation checks. This can lead to unauthorized data creation, namespace pollution, and potential corruption of subscriber metadata, impacting the integrity of the 5G core network. Organizations using free5GC, particularly in lab or test environments, should prioritize addressing this issue to safeguard against unauthorized access and data integrity risks.
Public Exploit Signal
A public exploit, PoC, GitHub repository or Metasploit reference was detected for this CVE.
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Original NVD Description
free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. In 4.2.3 and earlier, HandleCreateEeSubscriptions and HandleQueryeesubscriptions in free5gc/udr internal/sbi/api_datarepository.go validate the ueId path value with a regular expression whose final .+ alternative accepts every non-empty string instead of restricting identifiers to supported SUPI and GPSI formats. An actor with network reachability to the UDR SBI can submit a non-3GPP identifier to /nudr-dr/v2/subscription-data/{ueId}/context-data/ee-subscriptions, causing the identifier to pass validation and enter the normal create or query flow. The advisory does not independently establish whether authentication is required. Invalid identifiers can be persisted and retrieved as subscription records, enabling unauthorized data creation, UDR namespace pollution, persistent subscriber-metadata corruption, and interference with downstream components that trust stored identifiers to use valid 3GPP formats. The exposure is most relevant in lab, test, or loosely segmented service-based-interface deployments where direct UDR access is possible.