CyberRota Analysis
AI-GeneratedThe vulnerability affects Docker's upload-processing pipeline, allowing authenticated users to bypass entry-count and size limits when uploading single-stream compressed files, such as gzip bombs. This can lead to significant disk space exhaustion on shared volumes used by applications like OpenSearch, Logstash, Arkime, and Zeek, potentially disrupting services for all users. Organizations utilizing these applications should prioritize addressing this vulnerability to prevent service interruptions.
Public Exploit Signal
A public exploit, PoC, GitHub repository or Metasploit reference was detected for this CVE.
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Original NVD Description
Malcolm's upload-processing pipeline (scripts/safe-extract.py) enforces entry-count, nesting-depth, and total-uncompressed-byte limits when extracting container archives (zip/tar/rar/7z via libarchive), but those limits are not applied when the uploaded file is a single-stream compressed format (.gz, .bz2, .xz, .lzma, .lz) that isn't a .tar.*-style archive. Any authenticated user permitted to upload PCAP/log files can upload a small, highly compressible file (e.g. a gzip bomb) that decompresses to an effectively unbounded size on disk, exhausting the shared Docker volume used by OpenSearch, Logstash, Arkime, and Zeek, and disrupting the platform for all users.