OCTOBER 8, 2026
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Case File

CVE-2026-102714

HIGH · CVSS 7.1 EPSS 0.15% Public Exploit

Source: NVD + CISA KEV + EPSS · Published 2026-09-29 · Last synced 2026-10-08

CyberRota Analysis

AI-Generated

The vulnerability affects the `_nx_icmpv6_validate_options()` function, which improperly handles residual bytes during option scanning, leading to potential infinite loops or memory over-reads. This can cause denial-of-service conditions by freezing the system or corrupting memory, as attackers can manipulate the input to trigger these behaviors. Organizations utilizing affected networking products should prioritize addressing this vulnerability to mitigate risks of service disruption and memory corruption.

Public Exploit Signal

A public exploit, PoC, GitHub repository or Metasploit reference was detected for this CVE.

GitHub PoC Links

Note: these links are listed for security research and verification purposes only.

CVE
CVE-2026-102714
Severity
HIGH
CVSS
7.1
EPSS
0.15%

Original NVD Description

`_nx_icmpv6_validate_options()` scans the option area with `while (length > 2)` (`common/src/nx_icmpv6_validate_options.c:79`). An area whose size leaves a one- or two-byte residue exits the loop with that tail unexamined; the residue is not negative, so the function returns `NX_SUCCESS`. Its zero-length rejection never sees those bytes. Every consumer then re-walks the same area, reading a two-byte option header at the residue and subtracting `nx_icmpv6_option_length << 3` with no zero check and no remaining-length check. Three outcomes follow, selected by bytes the attacker controls. **Zero length byte.** The walker subtracts zero and advances zero. All four handlers loop forever — `_nx_icmpv6_process_ra` (`nx_icmpv6_process_ra.c:245, :528`), `_nx_icmpv6_process_ns` (`:251, :329`), `_nx_icmpv6_process_na` (`:147, :156`) and `_nx_icmpv6_process_redirect` (`:247, :350`). The walk runs in the IP thread, which is the highest-priority thread and does not yield inside the loop, so the system stops until a watchdog reset and the frame can be replayed after each one. **Non-zero length byte on a short residue.** The three unsigned counters underflow — `2 - 8` becomes `0xFFFFFFFA` — and the walk continues past the packet buffer, reading until it faults or meets a zero length byte and freezes. The Router Advertisement counter is signed and exits cleanly in this case. **One-byte residue.** The walker reads a two-byte option header, over-reading one byte. During a runaway walk, stray bytes parsing as a link-layer address option are copied into the neighbor cache (`nx_icmpv6_process_ns.c:280, :293`) and subsequently used as the destination MAC for frames to that neighbour, placing off-packet memory on the link. Confirmed by inspection, not reproduced.