CyberRota Analysis
AI-GeneratedFroxlor versions prior to 2.3.12 are vulnerable due to inadequate restrictions on the system.letsencryptchallengepath setting, allowing an attacker with administrative access or the ability to modify settings to inject arbitrary commands into the acme.sh execution context, potentially leading to root command execution or arbitrary file writes. Organizations using affected versions should prioritize this vulnerability to mitigate the risk of unauthorized access and system compromise.
Public Exploit Signal
A public exploit, PoC, GitHub repository or Metasploit reference was detected for this CVE.
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Original NVD Description
Froxlor before 2.3.12 does not restrict or escape the system.letsencryptchallengepath setting: unlike sibling settings hardened in GHSA-33mp, the field has no string_regexp or required_otp guard, and its value is concatenated unescaped into the acme.sh command line built in lib/Froxlor/Cron/Http/LetsEncrypt/AcmeSh.php and executed by the root cron via FileDir::safe_exec. Because safe_exec only blacklists shell metacharacters such as ; | & > < \ $ ~ ?, spaces and quotes survive and the value is word-split into additional acme.sh arguments. An administrator, or any actor able to write settings (for example through the settings-import API), can therefore inject acme.sh options such as --renew-hook, --pre-hook or --post-hook to obtain arbitrary command execution as root at the next Let's Encrypt cron run, or use --config-home/--cert-home for arbitrary file writes. Versions up to and including 2.3.10 are affected; the issue is fixed in 2.3.12.