CVE Database

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbcon: Avoid OOB font access if console rotation fails Clear the font buffer if the reallocation during console rotation fails in fbcon_rotate_font(). The putcs implementations for the rotated buffer will return early in this case. See [1] for an example. Currently, fbcon_rotate_font() keeps the old buffer, which is too small for the rotated font. Printing to the rotated console with a high-enough character code will overflow the font buffer. v2: - fix typos in commit message

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mtd: spi-nor: debugfs: fix out-of-bounds read in spi_nor_params_show() Sashiko noticed an out-of-bounds read [1]. In spi_nor_params_show(), the snor_f_names array is passed to spi_nor_print_flags() using sizeof(snor_f_names). Since snor_f_names is an array of pointers, sizeof() returns the total number of bytes occupied by the pointers (element_count * sizeof(void *)) rather than the element count itself. On 64-bit systems, this makes the passed length 8x larger than intended. Inside spi_nor_print_flags(), the 'names_len' argument is used to bounds-check the 'names' array access. An out-of-bounds read occurs if a flag bit is set that exceeds the array's actual element count but is within the inflated byte-size count. Correct this by using ARRAY_SIZE() to pass the actual number of string pointers in the array.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/vmw_pvrdma: Fix double free on pvrdma_alloc_ucontext() error path Sashiko points out that pvrdma_uar_free() is already called within pvrdma_dealloc_ucontext(), so calling it before triggers a double free.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/sysfs-schemes: protect path kfree() with damon_sysfs_lock damon_sysfs_quot_goal->path can be read and written by users, via DAMON sysfs 'path' file. It can also be indirectly read, for the parameters {on,off}line committing to DAMON. The reads for parameters committing are protected by damon_sysfs_lock to avoid the sysfs files being destroyed while any of the parameters are being read. But the user-driven direct reads and writes are not protected by any lock, while the write is deallocating the path-pointing buffer. As a result, the readers could read the already freed buffer (user-after-free). Note that the user-reads don't race when the same open file is used by the writer, due to kernfs's open file locking. Nonetheless, doing the reads and writes with separate open files would be common. Fix it by protecting both the user-direct reads and writes with damon_sysfs_lock.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/mlx4: Fix mis-use of RCU in mlx4_srq_event() Sashiko points out the radix_tree itself is RCU safe, but nothing ever frees the mlx4_srq struct with RCU, and it isn't even accessed within the RCU critical section. It also will crash if an event is delivered before the srq object is finished initializing. Use the spinlock since it isn't easy to make RCU work, use refcount_inc_not_zero() to protect against partially initialized objects, and order the refcount_set() to be after the srq is fully initialized.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: brcmfmac: Fix potential use-after-free issue when stopping watchdog task Watchdog task might end between send_sig() and kthread_stop() calls, what results in the use-after-free issue. Fix this by increasing watchdog task reference count before calling send_sig() and dropping it by switching to kthread_stop_put().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/mlx4: Fix resource leak on error in mlx4_ib_create_srq() Sashiko points out that mlx4_srq_alloc() was not undone during error unwind, add the missing call to mlx4_srq_free().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipmi: Add limits to event and receive message requests The driver would just fetch events and receive messages until the BMC said it was done. To avoid issues with BMCs that never say they are done, add a limit of 10 fetches at a time. In addition, an si interface has an attn state it can return from the hardware which is supposed to cause a flag fetch to see if the driver needs to fetch events or message or a few other things. If the attn bit gets stuck, it's a similar problem. So allow messages in between flag fetches so the driver itself doesn't get stuck. This is a more general fix than the previous fix for the specific bad BMC, but should fix the more general issue of a BMC that won't stop saying it has data. This has been there from the beginning of the driver. It's not a bug per-se, but it is accounting for bugs in BMCs.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/mlx5: Fix error path fall-through in mlx5_ib_dev_res_srq_init() mlx5_ib_dev_res_srq_init() allocates two SRQs, s0 and s1. When ib_create_srq() fails for s1, the error branch destroys s0 but falls through and unconditionally assigns the freed s0 and the ERR_PTR s1 to devr->s0 and devr->s1. This leads to several problems: the lock-free fast path checks "if (devr->s1) return 0;" and treats the ERR_PTR as already initialised; users in mlx5_ib_create_qp() dereference the freed SRQ or ERR_PTR via to_msrq(devr->s0)->msrq.srqn; and mlx5_ib_dev_res_cleanup() dereferences the ERR_PTR and double-frees s0 on teardown. Fix by adding the same `goto unlock` in the s1 failure path.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: fix fsck inconsistency caused by FGGC of node block During FGGC node block migration, fsck may incorrectly treat the migrated node block as fsync-written data. The reproduction scenario: root@vm:/mnt/f2fs# seq 1 2048 | xargs -n 1 ./test_sync // write inline inode and sync root@vm:/mnt/f2fs# rm -f 1 root@vm:/mnt/f2fs# sync root@vm:/mnt/f2fs# f2fs_io gc_range // move data block in sync mode and not write CP SPO, "fsck --dry-run" find inode has already checkpointed but still with DENT_BIT_SHIFT set The root cause is that GC does not clear the dentry mark and fsync mark during node block migration, leading fsck to misinterpret them as user-issued fsync writes. In BGGC mode, node block migration is handled by f2fs_sync_node_pages(), which guarantees the dentry and fsync marks are cleared before writing. This patch move the set/clear of the fsync|dentry marks into __write_node_folio to make the logic clearer, and ensures the fsync|dentry mark is cleared in FGGC.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/CPU/AMD: Prevent improper isolation of shared resources in Zen2's op cache Make sure resources are not improperly shared in the op cache and cause instruction corruption this way.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: exit: prevent preemption of oopsing TASK_DEAD task When an already-exiting task oopses, make_task_dead() currently calls do_task_dead() with preemption enabled. That is forbidden: do_task_dead() calls __schedule(), which has a comment saying "WARNING: must be called with preemption disabled!". If an oopsing task is preempted in do_task_dead(), between becoming TASK_DEAD and entering the scheduler explicitly, bad things happen: finish_task_switch() assumes that once the scheduler has switched away from a TASK_DEAD task, the task can never run again and its stack is no longer needed; but that assumption apparently doesn't hold if the dead task was preempted (the SM_PREEMPT case). This means that the scheduler ends up repeatedly dropping references on the dead task's stack, which can lead to use-after-free or double-free of the entire task stack; in other words, two tasks can end up running on the same stack, resulting in various kinds of memory corruption. (This does not just affect "recursively oopsing" tasks; it is enough to oops once during task exit, for example in a file_operations::release handler)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: use safe list iteration in radar detect work The call to ieee80211_dfs_cac_cancel can cause the iterated chanctx to be freed and removed from the list. Guard against this to avoid a slab-use-after-free error.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix double free in create_space_info_sub_group() error path When kobject_init_and_add() fails, the call chain is: create_space_info_sub_group() -> btrfs_sysfs_add_space_info_type() -> kobject_init_and_add() -> failure -> kobject_put(&sub_group->kobj) -> space_info_release() -> kfree(sub_group) Then control returns to create_space_info_sub_group(), where: btrfs_sysfs_add_space_info_type() returns error -> kfree(sub_group) Thus, sub_group is freed twice. Keep parent->sub_group[index] = NULL for the failure path, but after btrfs_sysfs_add_space_info_type() has called kobject_put(), let the kobject release callback handle the cleanup.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: b43legacy: enforce bounds check on firmware key index in RX path Same fix as b43: the firmware-controlled key index in b43legacy_rx() can exceed dev->max_nr_keys. The existing B43legacy_WARN_ON is non-enforcing in production builds, allowing an out-of-bounds read of dev->key[]. Make the check enforcing by dropping the frame for invalid indices.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ice: fix double free in ice_sf_eth_activate() error path When auxiliary_device_add() fails, ice_sf_eth_activate() jumps to aux_dev_uninit and calls auxiliary_device_uninit(&sf_dev->adev). The device release callback ice_sf_dev_release() frees sf_dev, but the current error path falls through to sf_dev_free and calls kfree(sf_dev) again, causing a double free. Keep kfree(sf_dev) for the auxiliary_device_init() failure path, but avoid falling through to sf_dev_free after auxiliary_device_uninit().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: pcm: oss: Fix data race at accessing runtime.oss.trigger Currently the runtime.oss.trigger field may be accessed concurrently without protection, which may lead to the data race. And, in this case, it may lead to more severe problem because it's a bit field; as writing the data, it may overwrite other bit fields as well, which confuses the operation completely, as spotted by fuzzing. Fix it by covering runtime.oss.trigger bit fled also with the existing params_lock mutex in both snd_pcm_oss_get_trigger() and snd_pcm_oss_poll().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched_ext: Read scx_root under scx_cgroup_ops_rwsem in cgroup setters scx_group_set_{weight,idle,bandwidth}() cache scx_root before acquiring scx_cgroup_ops_rwsem, so the pointer can be stale by the time the op runs. If the loaded scheduler is disabled and freed (via RCU work) and another is enabled between the naked load and the rwsem acquire, the reader sees scx_cgroup_enabled=true (the new scheduler's) but dereferences the freed one - UAF on SCX_HAS_OP(sch, ...) / SCX_CALL_OP(sch, ...). scx_cgroup_enabled is toggled only under scx_cgroup_ops_rwsem write (scx_cgroup_{init,exit}), so reading scx_root inside the rwsem read section correlates @sch with the enabled snapshot.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: drop stray 'static' from fast-RX rx_result ieee80211_invoke_fast_rx() is documented as safe for parallel RX, but its per-invocation rx_result is declared static. Concurrent callers then share one instance and can overwrite each other's result between ieee80211_rx_mesh_data() and the switch on res. That can make a packet that was queued or consumed by ieee80211_rx_mesh_data() fall through into ieee80211_rx_8023(), or make a packet that should continue return as queued. Make res an automatic variable so each invocation keeps its own result.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fanotify: fix false positive on permission events fsnotify_get_mark_safe() may return false for a mark on an unrelated group, which results in bypassing the permission check. Fix by skipping over detached marks that are not in the current group.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: configfs: Bound snprintf() return in tg_pt_gp_members_show() target_tg_pt_gp_members_show() formats LUN paths with snprintf() into a 256-byte stack buffer, then will memcpy() cur_len bytes from that buffer. snprintf() returns the length the output would have had, which can exceed the buffer size when the fabric WWN is long because iSCSI IQN names can be up to 223 bytes. The check at the memcpy() site only guards the destination page write, not the source read, so memcpy() will read past the stack buffer and copy adjacent stack contents to the sysfs reader, which when CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE is enabled, fortify_panic() will be triggered. Commit 27e06650a5ea ("scsi: target: target_core_configfs: Add length check to avoid buffer overflow") added the same bound to the target_lu_gp_members_show() but the tg_pt_gp variant was missed so resolve that here.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/mana: Validate rx_hash_key_len Sashiko points out that rx_hash_key_len comes from a uAPI structure and is blindly passed to memcpy, allowing the userspace to trash kernel memory. Bounds check it so the memcpy cannot overflow.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btmtk: validate WMT event SKB length before struct access btmtk_usb_hci_wmt_sync() casts the WMT event response SKB data to struct btmtk_hci_wmt_evt (7 bytes) and struct btmtk_hci_wmt_evt_funcc (9 bytes) without first checking that the SKB contains enough data. A short firmware response causes out-of-bounds reads from SKB tailroom. Use skb_pull_data() to validate and advance past the base WMT event header. For the FUNC_CTRL case, pull the additional status field bytes before accessing them.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_event: Fix OOB read and infinite loop in hci_le_create_big_complete_evt hci_le_create_big_complete_evt() iterates over BT_BOUND connections for a BIG handle using a while loop, accessing ev->bis_handle[i++] on each iteration. However, there is no check that i stays within ev->num_bis before the array access. When a controller sends a LE_Create_BIG_Complete event with fewer bis_handle entries than there are BT_BOUND connections for that BIG, or with num_bis=0, the loop reads beyond the valid bis_handle[] flex array into adjacent heap memory. Since the out-of-bounds values typically exceed HCI_CONN_HANDLE_MAX (0x0EFF), hci_conn_set_handle() rejects them and the connection remains in BT_BOUND state. The same connection is then found again by hci_conn_hash_lookup_big_state(), creating an infinite loop with hci_dev_lock held. Fix this by terminating the BIG if in case not all BIS could be setup properly.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7921: fix a potential clc buffer length underflow The buf_len is used to limit the iterations for retrieving the country power setting and may underflow under certain conditions due to changes in the power table in CLC. This underflow leads to an almost infinite loop or an invalid power setting resulting in driver initialization failure.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: Reject unknown opcodes before ICRC processing Even after applying commit 7244491dab34 ("RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv"), a single unauthenticated UDP packet can still trigger panic. That patch handled payload_size() underflow only for valid opcodes with short packets, not for packets carrying an unknown opcode. The unknown-opcode OOB read described below predates that commit and reaches back to the initial Soft RoCE driver. The check added there reads pkt->paylen < header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE where header_size(pkt) expands to rxe_opcode[pkt->opcode].length. The rxe_opcode[] array has 256 entries but is only populated for defined IB opcodes; any other entry (for example opcode 0xff) is zero-initialized, so length == 0 and the check degenerates to pkt->paylen < 0 + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE which does not constrain pkt->paylen enough. rxe_icrc_hdr() then computes rxe_opcode[pkt->opcode].length - RXE_BTH_BYTES which underflows when length == 0 and passes a huge value to rxe_crc32(), causing an out-of-bounds read of the skb payload. Reproduced on v7.0-rc7 with that fix applied, QEMU/KVM with CONFIG_RDMA_RXE=y and CONFIG_KASAN=y, after rdma link add rxe0 type rxe netdev eth0 A single 48-byte UDP packet to port 4791 with BTH opcode=0xff and QPN=IB_MULTICAST_QPN triggers: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in crc32_le+0x115/0x170 Read of size 1 at addr ... The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 704-byte region Call Trace: crc32_le+0x115/0x170 rxe_icrc_hdr.isra.0+0x226/0x300 rxe_icrc_check+0x13f/0x3a0 rxe_rcv+0x6e1/0x16e0 rxe_udp_encap_recv+0x20a/0x320 udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0x7ed/0x12c0 Subsequent packets with the same shape fault on unmapped memory and panic the kernel. The trigger requires only module load and "rdma link add"; no QP, no connection, and no authentication. Fix this by rejecting packets whose opcode has no rxe_opcode[] entry, detected via the zero mask or zero length, before any length arithmetic runs.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-verity-fec: fix reading parity bytes split across blocks (take 3) fec_decode_bufs() assumes that the parity bytes of the first RS codeword it decodes are never split across parity blocks. This assumption is false. Consider v->fec->block_size == 4096 && v->fec->roots == 17 && fio->nbufs == 1, for example. In that case, each call to fec_decode_bufs() consumes v->fec->roots * (fio->nbufs << DM_VERITY_FEC_BUF_RS_BITS) = 272 parity bytes. Considering that the parity data for each message block starts on a block boundary, the byte alignment in the parity data will iterate through 272*i mod 4096 until the 3 parity blocks have been consumed. On the 16th call (i=15), the alignment will be 4080 bytes into the first block. Only 16 bytes remain in that block, but 17 parity bytes will be needed. The code reads out-of-bounds from the parity block buffer. Fortunately this doesn't normally happen, since it can occur only for certain non-default values of fec_roots *and* when the maximum number of buffers couldn't be allocated due to low memory. For example with block_size=4096 only the following cases are affected: fec_roots=17: nbufs in [1, 3, 5, 15] fec_roots=19: nbufs in [1, 229] fec_roots=21: nbufs in [1, 3, 5, 13, 15, 39, 65, 195] fec_roots=23: nbufs in [1, 89] Regardless, fix it by refactoring how the parity blocks are read.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix double free in create_space_info() error path When kobject_init_and_add() fails, the call chain is: create_space_info() -> btrfs_sysfs_add_space_info_type() -> kobject_init_and_add() -> failure -> kobject_put(&space_info->kobj) -> space_info_release() -> kfree(space_info) Then control returns to create_space_info(): btrfs_sysfs_add_space_info_type() returns error -> goto out_free -> kfree(space_info) This causes a double free. Keep the direct kfree(space_info) for the earlier failure path, but after btrfs_sysfs_add_space_info_type() has called kobject_put(), let the kobject release callback handle the cleanup.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: remove station if connection prep fails If connection preparation fails for MLO connections, then the interface is completely reset to non-MLD. In this case, we must not keep the station since it's related to the link of the vif being removed. Delete an existing station. Any "new_sta" is already being removed, so that doesn't need changes. This fixes a use-after-free/double-free in debugfs if that's enabled, because a vif going from MLD (and to MLD, but that's not relevant here) recreates its entire debugfs.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: isofs: validate block number from NFS file handle in isofs_export_iget isofs_fh_to_dentry() and isofs_fh_to_parent() pass an attacker- controlled block number (ifid->block or ifid->parent_block) from the NFS file handle to isofs_export_iget(), which only rejects block == 0 before calling isofs_iget() and ultimately sb_bread(). A crafted file handle with fh_len sufficient to pass the check added by commit 0405d4b63d08 ("isofs: Prevent the use of too small fid") can still drive the server to read any in-range block on the backing device as if it were an iso_directory_record. That earlier fix was assigned CVE-2025-37780. sb_bread() on an out-of-range block returns NULL cleanly via the EIO path, so there is no memory-safety violation. For in-range reads of adjacent-partition data on the same block device, the unrelated bytes end up in iso_inode_info fields that reach the NFS client as dentry metadata. The deployment surface (isofs exported over NFS from loop-mounted images) is narrow and requires an authenticated NFS peer, but the malformed-file-handle class is reportable as hardening next to the existing CVE-2025-37780 fix. Reject block >= ISOFS_SB(sb)->s_nzones in isofs_export_iget() so the check covers both isofs_fh_to_dentry() and isofs_fh_to_parent() call sites with a single line.