CVE Database

Rainbond through 6.9.7 contains a broken access control vulnerability in the CheckToken function that allows authenticated attackers to access unauthorized enterprise resources by substituting another enterprise's tenant name in URL paths. Attackers can use any valid API token to bypass enterprise ID verification and access or modify another enterprise's services, plugins, environment variables, and certificates.

CyberPanel before 3.0.0 contains a hard-coded JWT secret vulnerability in the WebTerminal FastAPI SSH service that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to forge valid authentication tokens and obtain an interactive root shell via WebSocket on port 8888. Attackers can craft a forged JWT signed with the hardcoded secret value, specifying ssh_user=root, to authenticate to the terminal service without any valid credentials and receive a root shell.

CyberPanel before 3.0.0 contains a path traversal vulnerability that allows authenticated administrators to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem by supplying unsanitized file paths to the cloudAPI ReadReport endpoint. Attackers can manipulate the reportFile parameter in the JSON request body, which is passed directly to open() in cloudManager.py without validation or allowlisting, enabling traversal to any file readable by the root-privileged CyberPanel process including credential files, SSL and SSH private keys, and JWT secret files.

The 'podman quadlet install --replace' command opens the existing destination file with O_CREATE|O_WRONLY but omits O_TRUNC. When the initial reflink copy attempt fails (common on non-reflink-capable filesystems including many RHEL default XFS configurations), the fallback in ReflinkOrCopy uses io.Copy which performs a non-truncating write. If the original Quadlet is larger than the new Quadlet, the file is not truncated and content from the original is preserved. The command completes with no warning. There is no risk of information leakage as the user already had access to the Quadlet in order to replace it, and in most cases, this would only lead to invalid Quadlet files. However, security-related options from the end of the old Quadlet could be included in the new Quadlet, and if the truncation resulted in a valid Quadlet file, this could result in undesirable behavior. For example, running podman quadlet install --replace to remove a single line from the end of a Quadlet - including security-sensitive content, like AddCapability - will fail, and the option will continue to be used. Further, with Volume Quadlets, this can include additional mounts which can cause content to be unintentionally exposed into containers. If, later, the image is updated then compromised content might be leaked to an attacker. The vulnerable code paths are in pkg/domain/infra/abi/quadlet.go (lines 338-360, O_CREATE|O_WRONLY without O_TRUNC) and vendor/go.podman.io/storage/pkg/fileutils/reflink_linux.go (lines 12-19, non-truncating io.Copy fallback).

A SQL query validation bypass in the Flint extension query handler in the OpenSearch SQL plugin allows a remote authenticated actor with async query access to execute arbitrary code on Apache Spark workers by sending a crafted SQL query to the direct query endpoint.

Rejected reason: ** REJECT ** DO NOT USE THIS CANDIDATE NUMBER. Reason: This candidate was issued in error. Notes: All references and descriptions in this candidate have been removed to prevent accidental usage.

The Bluetooth host GATT client function parse_read_std_char_desc() in subsys/bluetooth/host/gatt.c parses an ATT Read By Type Response received from a remote GATT server during BT_GATT_DISCOVER_STD_CHAR_DESC discovery. The per-entry stride rsp->len is taken directly from the peer's PDU, and the parse loop both tests its exit condition (length >= rsp->len) and advances (length -= rsp->len, pdu += rsp->len) using that value. The minimum value of rsp->len was never validated before the loop. A malicious or malfunctioning peer can reply with rsp->len = 0. Because length is unsigned and never decreases, the loop condition stays true forever and the read pointer never advances; as long as the body is at least a few bytes with a non-zero handle and a matching descriptor UUID, the host repeatedly re-parses the same bytes and invokes the discovery callback, never terminating. This hangs the Bluetooth host processing thread (CWE-835, loop with unreachable exit condition). The condition is reachable by any connected peer once the local device initiates standard-descriptor-value discovery; GATT discovery does not require bonding or encryption, so an unauthenticated adjacent attacker that the device connects to can trigger it. The impact is denial of service of the Bluetooth subsystem (and likely a watchdog reset on constrained targets); there is no memory disclosure or corruption. The fix adds a rsp->len < sizeof(struct bt_att_data) check before the loop, rejecting under-length responses so the stride is always non-zero and the loop terminates. The sibling parsers parse_include() and parse_characteristic() already validated rsp->len and are unaffected.

Hongjing e-HR contains an unauthenticated SQL injection vulnerability in the getSdutyTree servlet endpoint that allows remote unauthenticated attackers to access protected resources by supplying a path traversal sequence in the request URI to bypass the oauthservlet authentication filter. Attackers can inject UNION-based SQL payloads through the unsanitized codeitemid parameter into the underlying Microsoft SQL Server query to retrieve sensitive database contents including user credentials. Exploitation evidence was first observed by the Shadowserver Foundation on 2024-07-30 (UTC).

ASP-CMS contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the commentList.asp endpoint that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to inject arbitrary SQL by manipulating the id parameter in GET requests to the comment listing script. Attackers can bypass the application's keyword blocklist by interleaving the string 'master' within blocked SQL terms to extract sensitive database contents. Exploitation evidence was first observed by the Shadowserver Foundation on 2023-10-18 (UTC).

A flaw was found in the clusterclaims-controller component of Multicluster Engine (MCE). An authenticated tenant can exploit this vulnerability by manipulating ClusterClaim labels. This allows the tenant to force a cluster to join a ManagedClusterSet belonging to another tenant. Such unauthorized access could enable the injection of policies and workloads into other tenants' clusters.

SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata

Unbounded Arch package file metadata can cause resource amplification in Gitea package uploads

SQL injection in the Zalktis accounting application via trading-partner-controlled text fields in received electronic invoices. When importing a received e-invoice (UBL/PEPPOL) or an e-commerce export, Zalktis concatenates partner-controlled values directly into SQL statement text using string concatenation, with neither parameterised queries nor escaping. The application's own escaping helper, Dazadi.sql_txt(), is not invoked on these code paths, so a party that sends an invoice can break out of the string literal and alter the query logic. This issue affects Zalktis: before 2026.1.586 and before 2026.2.592.

Webhook Authorization Header Returned in Plaintext via API

GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp ClearRepoWatches fix not applied to API EditRepo path — sister code path retains stale watches on public->private

Two SSRF vulnerabilities in Gitea migration/mirror (DNS rebinding + missing re-validation)

Private Repository Existence Disclosure via go-get Meta Endpoint

Cross-repository label-ID enumeration oracle via unscoped DeleteIssueLabel API

Personal access token scope enforcement bypass on the repository home page (`GET /{owner}/{repo}`) discloses private repository contents

Public-only repository tokens can update private PR head branches

Repository migration SSRF via multi-answer DNS allow-list bypass

SSRF in restore-repo via unsanitized pull_request.yml Head.CloneURL

Webhooks created by a collaborator keep firing after their repo access is revoked → ongoing real-time exfiltration of private repo content (incomplete revocation cleanup in `DeleteCollaboration`)

Branch Protection Bypass via PR Retargeting Preserves Stale `official` Approval Flag

Cross-repository IDOR in issue-dependency removal lets an attacker tamper with and comment on private repos they cannot access

Repository Visibility Manipulation via Git Push Options

ParseAcceptLanguage quadratic-time DoS via Locale middleware on unauthenticated requests

Gitea LFS Deploy-Key Privilege Escalation

Private Repository Metadata Remains Accessible After Access Revocation

Team-repository linking endpoint bypasses the RepoAdminChangeTeamAccess organization setting