CVE Database

IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information and manipulate files due to a path traversal vulnerability.

IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 is vulnerable to stored cross-site scripting. This vulnerability allows an authenticated user to embed arbitrary JavaScript code in the Web UI thus altering the intended functionality potentially leading to credentials disclosure within a trusted session.

An authenticated user without repository read permission may access package metadata under specific conditions.

An unauthenticated user may access restricted artifacts in JFrog Artifactory under specific conditions.

Apache Airflow's asset materialization endpoint (`POST /api/v2/assets/{asset_id}/materialize`) and the XCom result check on `wait_dag_run_until_finished` authorized the target Dag without its team, unlike every other authorization site. A team-aware auth manager distinguishes a team-scoped Dag from a global one by that field -- the Keycloak auth manager, for example, checks the `DAG` resource instead of `DAG:<team>` -- so the team-scoped permission that should gate the request was never consulted. In a deployment running multi-team mode with a team-aware auth manager, an authenticated user in one team could trigger Dag runs belonging to another team, supplying their own `dag_run_id` and `conf`, and could read another team's XCom values. Deployments using the FAB auth manager are unaffected, as it has no multi-team support. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later, which resolves the Dag's team at both sites.

Apache Airflow's Task SDK did not mask the contents of a Variable whose JSON value is a list, so secrets stored in that shape appeared in cleartext in task logs and in the Rendered Templates UI. Masking was applied only when the deserialized value was a string or a dict; a list at the top level matched neither and was returned unmasked. Any authenticated user able to read the logs or rendered templates of a task that references such a Variable could recover the values, with no special configuration required. This is the list-shaped counterpart of CVE-2026-59244, whose fix covered the dict case only, so deployments that upgraded in response to that advisory remain affected and must upgrade again. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later.

Apache Airflow wrote Variable values and Connection `extra` contents to the audit log in cleartext when they were submitted through the bulk endpoints (`PATCH /api/v2/variables` and `PATCH /api/v2/connections`). The audit-log masking recognised only top-level request fields, and a bulk request nests its entities two levels below, so no masking was applied to them. Any authenticated user with audit-log read access -- who need not hold Variables or Connections read at all -- could recover those secrets verbatim, and the Connection `extra` copy is stored unencrypted in the log while the connection table encrypts it. The Airflow UI's *Import Variables* action posts to this endpoint, so an ordinary operator import wrote every secret in the file to the log. This is a different code path from CVE-2026-50204: that fix shipped in 3.3.0 and covers the single-entity endpoints only, so deployments that upgraded in response to that advisory remain affected and must upgrade again. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later.

A low-privileged authenticated user may access restricted support information under specific conditions.

Apache Airflow's environment-variable secrets backend resolved a team-scoped Connection or Variable from the wrong team's scope. The guard meant to prevent this only ran when no team scope was supplied, and its pattern could not match a team name containing an underscore, which team names are allowed to contain. When the guard did not apply, the lookup fell through to an unconditional global read that resolved the stored `AIRFLOW_CONN__<TEAM>___<ID>` variable regardless of which team asked. In multi-team mode an authenticated user of one team could therefore have `POST /api/v2/connections/test` resolve another team's Connection and authenticate outward with that team's credentials; the endpoint uses the credentials rather than returning them. Exploitation requires `[core] multi_team` enabled, `[core] test_connection` set to `Enabled` (it ships `Disabled`), team-scoped secrets provisioned as environment variables in the API-server process, and knowledge of the encoded identifier. Redirecting the test at an attacker-controlled host is separately blocked. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later.

An authenticated user may write data outside the intended Docker cache path under specific remote-repository conditions.

Under specific self-hosted Helm configurations, generated TLS private keys may be retained in rendered manifests accessible to highly privileged local users.

In WhatsUp Gold versions released before 2026.0.2, a privileged attacker can write arbitrary files to a web-accessible location on the host server.

In WhatsUp Gold versions released before 2026.0.2, a privileged attacker can create a LogToFile action specifying an arbitrary file extension within the IIS web root.

In WhatsUp Gold versions released before 2026.0.2, an improper authorization vulnerability in the Scheduled Reports API allows any authenticated user to invoke restricted actions.

Apache Airflow's Config API did not mask team-scoped sensitive configuration values in multi-team deployments. When an administrator has enabled multi-team mode and exposed the Config API, an authenticated Viewer holding only configuration-read access — with no prior access to the secret — could read a team-scoped Celery broker URL, including its embedded credentials, in cleartext, while the equivalent global option was correctly masked. The secrets masker matched only base section and option names and did not normalize team-prefixed sections before the sensitivity check (CWE-200). This is a distinct masker bypass from CVE-2026-48828 and CVE-2026-48892: deployments that upgraded to apache-airflow 3.3.0 to address those issues remain affected by this team-scoped variant. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later, which normalizes team-scoped sections before masking.

Apache Airflow's secrets masker did not mask `var.json` Variable values whose value is a dict in the Rendered Templates UI — the dict value failed an `isinstance(str)` guard — so a secret stored as a JSON Variable and referenced in a template via `var.json` was displayed in cleartext to any user with access to that task's Rendered Templates view. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later, which masks nested Variable values regardless of type.

Apache Airflow's XCom `GET /api/v2/{...}/xcomEntries/{key}?deserialize=true` endpoint passed a string-literal payload through `BaseXCom.deserialize_value` without the `_check_forbidden_xcom_keys` guard, allowing an authenticated API user with XCom write-and-read access to instantiate arbitrary `airflow.*` classes on the API server (CWE-502). An authenticated user who can write an XCom value and then read it back with `deserialize=true` triggers the unsafe instantiation. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later, which rejects reserved XCom serialization keys submitted as JSON string literals.

Apache Airflow's secrets masker hides values stored under sensitive key names when they are displayed in the UI. The masker's recursion-depth limit did not descend into values nested inside a list, tuple, or set beyond that limit, so an Airflow Variable holding such a deeply-nested value was shown unmasked in the Variables UI. The exposure is limited to the UI: any authenticated user who can see the Variable in the UI can already read its full value through the Variables REST API, so this does not disclose data the user could not otherwise obtain — the masking is a shoulder-surfing defense for the UI, not an access-control boundary. This is an incomplete-fix follow-up to CVE-2026-42358, whose fix made only the dictionary walk unbounded; lists, tuples, and sets beyond the depth limit remained unmasked in the UI. Deployments that applied the CVE-2026-42358 fix should also upgrade to address this residual case. Upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later.

Multiple Use-After-Free vulnerabilities were found in the add_archive_element function in ld/ldmain.c of the GNU linker (ld), a component of binutils. The root cause is that plugin_maybe_claim() in ld/plugin.c frees the original BFD object via bfd_close/_bfd_delete_bfd when entry->the_bfd->my_archive == NULL, but the caller retains both the original abfd parameter and a shallow copy (orig_input.the_bfd) as dangling pointers. These dangling pointers are subsequently dereferenced at three distinct locations in add_archive_element: 1. Line ~1442: accessing abfd->my_archive via bfd_usrdata(abfd->my_archive) 2. Line ~1493: multiple accesses to abfd and abfd->my_archive in a conditional check and bfd_get_filename call 3. Line ~1525: dereferencing the shallow copy orig_input.the_bfd->my_archive in trace/verbose logging The vulnerability is triggered when LTO plugins are active (link_info.lto_plugin_active is true) and the input object has abfd->my_archive == NULL, which is a valid state for standalone object files. Red Hat builds binutils with --enable-plugins and --enable-lto, confirming the vulnerable code path is compiled in and reachable. An attacker who can supply a crafted object or archive file to a build process using LTO-enabled linking could exploit this flaw to cause a denial of service (linker crash via segmentation fault). Arbitrary code execution is theoretically possible through heap manipulation but is substantially mitigated by hardening measures including stack protector, FORTIFY_SOURCE, ASLR, and PIE. The attack surface is limited to build-time environments — the linker is a development tool not exposed in production runtime. The most realistic exploitation scenario is a supply chain attack introducing a crafted object file as a build dependency in CI/CD pipelines or development environments.

Vulnerability-Lookup contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the remote-instance synchronization functionality. Remote instance addresses were validated only for basic URL syntax before being stored, while the synchronization worker later dereferenced these addresses using requests.get() with automatic redirect handling and without enforcing network-boundary restrictions. An authenticated administrator with the admin:access permission could configure a remote instance whose address points to an internal, loopback, link-local, or cloud metadata HTTP(S) service. When synchronization is performed, the Vulnerability-Lookup server would issue the request from its own network context. An attacker could also use a publicly accessible URL that redirects to an internal destination, because redirects were previously followed without revalidating the destination. Successful exploitation could allow a privileged attacker to probe or interact with services that are accessible from the Vulnerability-Lookup server but not directly reachable by the attacker, including private network services or cloud instance metadata endpoints. The exact confidentiality, integrity, or availability impact depends on the services reachable from the application server. The patch introduces a shared outbound URL policy that restricts remote instances to HTTP(S), rejects non-public IP addresses, resolves hostnames at request time, and manually validates each redirect destination before following it. The implementation explicitly blocks private, loopback, link-local, multicast, reserved, and unspecified addresses.

An authorization bypass vulnerability in Vulnerability-Lookup allowed inactive or unconfirmed accounts to subscribe to Server-Sent Events (SSE) streams through the /pubsub/subscribe/<topic> endpoint. The token_required decorator used by the Pub/Sub interface authenticated requests solely by matching the X-API-KEY header against an existing user API key. Unlike the REST API authentication mechanism, it did not verify the account's is_active and is_confirmed state. Because the self-registration process issues an API key before account confirmation is completed, an attacker could create an account and immediately use the resulting API key to access Pub/Sub topics that should only be available to active, confirmed users. This could expose stream events that would otherwise be inaccessible through the REST API, including newly submitted or not-yet-moderated data such as comments. The vulnerability results from inconsistent authorization enforcement between the REST API and the SSE streaming interface. The patch corrects the issue by requiring accounts to be both active and confirmed before permitting access to Pub/Sub streams, bringing the SSE authorization boundary in line with the REST API.

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability existed in Vulnerability-Lookup in the render_tag_badges Jinja filter used to display reference tags associated with vulnerability records. Values from containers.cna.references[].tags[] were directly interpolated into HTML badge elements and the resulting string was wrapped in markupsafe.Markup. Because Markup marks the generated content as safe, Jinja's automatic HTML escaping was bypassed. An authenticated user with permissions to create or modify vulnerability records, such as a user holding the vulnerability:create or vulnerability:modify permission, could submit a crafted reference tag through the CNA API containing arbitrary HTML or JavaScript-capable markup. The malicious value would subsequently be stored as part of the vulnerability record. When another user visited the corresponding public /cve/<id> or /vuln/<id> page, the crafted tag would be rendered as HTML in the viewer's browser. This could result in JavaScript execution in the security context of the Vulnerability-Lookup application. Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to perform actions in the context of a victim, access information available to the victim's browser session, or modify page content. As the affected vulnerability pages can be accessed publicly, exploitation may affect users who are not authenticated. The issue was corrected by applying markupsafe.escape() to each reference tag before inserting it into the HTML badge markup, while retaining Markup only for the static HTML scaffolding.

RustFS is a distributed object storage system built in Rust. Prior to 1.0.0-beta.12, an anonymous ListObjectVersions request in rustfs/src/storage/access.rs that lacks a direct bucket-policy grant falls back to an s3:ListBucket check and returns before the policy_allowed path applies deny_anonymous_table_data_plane_if_needed and RestrictPublicBuckets, so a bucket that permits anonymous listing can continue exposing version listings after an operator enables the public-access control. The bypass affects GET /<bucket>?versions= and can disclose object version metadata even though equivalent GetObject requests are denied. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.0-beta.12.

RustFS is a distributed object storage system built in Rust. Prior to 1.0.0-rc.1, RustFS Object Lock enforcement in crates/ecstore/src/bucket/object_lock/objectlock_sys.rs lets check_object_lock_for_deletion, delete_prefix, and lifecycle and scanner sweeps treat ConfigNotFound, unreadable .metadata.bin data, or unparseable metadata as no lock configuration, allowing objects under COMPLIANCE retention to be deleted or expired. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.0-rc.1.

RustFS is a distributed object storage system built in Rust. Prior to 1.0.0-beta.12, RustFS handles FTPS MKD in FtpsDriver::mkd in crates/protocols/src/ftps/driver.rs by calling storage.create_bucket without authorize_operation for S3Action::CreateBucket, allowing authenticated FTPS users denied s3:CreateBucket to create buckets. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.0-beta.12.

RustFS is a distributed object storage system built in Rust. RustFS authorizes explicit versionId reads in GetObject, CopyObject sources, and UploadPartCopy sources with s3:GetObject instead of s3:GetObjectVersion, allowing principals without historical-version permission to disclose known historical object content. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.0-beta.11.

Prowler is a cloud security platform. Prior to 5.37.0, Prowler's HTML output formatter in prowler/lib/outputs/html/html.py inserted finding.resource_tags, assembled by unroll_dict and parse_html_string, into generated reports without HTML escaping, allowing a cloud principal who can modify a scanned resource tag to store HTML or JavaScript that executes when another user opens the report. This issue is fixed in version 5.37.0.

An unauthenticated user may bypass authentication under specific cache conditions.

A party with write access to stored session data may affect JFrog Artifactory under specific conditions.

A bundle writer may create misleading release promotion information under specific conditions.