CVE Database

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: loongson: Fix error handling in ACPI property parsing In loongson_card_parse_acpi(), the return value of device_property_read_string() for the `codec-dai-name` property was ignored. If the property is missing or invalid, an uninitialized pointer would be used later, potentially leading to undefined behavior. Fix this by checking the return value and propagating the error appropriately.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: buffer: Fix potential use-after-free in anonymous buffer release An anonymous buffer handle holds a reference to the underlying IIO device. The reference is dropped in the buffer handle's release function. If the device has been removed, either through unbind or hot-unplug, the buffer handle might hold the last reference. The release function takes the mutex for the buffer using a guard, which means the unlock happens after all the code in the function, including `iio_device_put()`. If the anonymous buffer holds the last reference this might free both the IIO device and the buffer, which contains the mutex, leading to use-after-free when the mutex is unlocked. Fix this by using a scoped guard just around the buffer dmabuf list access, making sure the mutex is unlocked before releasing the IIO device. Version 10 of the patch that introduced this issue used this exact scheme of first unlocking and then dropping the reference [1]. During review it was suggested to use a guard instead, and version 11 made that change [2].

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: buffer: Make IIO DMA fence release RCU-safe The `dma_fence` documentation states that if a custom release implementation is provided, the `dma_fence` object must be freed in an RCU-safe way. The current `iio_dma_fence` implementation uses `kfree()`, which might result in a use-after-free. Remove the custom `release` implementation. This makes the DMA fence core fall back to `dma_fence_free()`, which calls `kfree_rcu()` on the fence. This requires that the fence be the first member of `struct iio_dma_fence`. Using the default release method for extended DMA fence structures is a common pattern.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: buffer: Tie IIO dma fence lock lifetime to the fence The `iio_dma_fence` implementation currently uses a lock embedded in the `iio_dmabuf_priv`. But the `iio_dma_fence` can outlive the `iio_dmabuf_priv`, which can cause a use-after-free. Tie the lifetime of the lock to the lifetime of the fence by embedding them in the same struct. We can't just hold a reference to the `iio_dmabuf_priv` from the `iio_dma_fence` since `iio_buffer_dmabuf_release()` might sleep and the fence release callback is not allowed to sleep. Note that the `dma_fence` framework now has an internal lock that gets used when the passing `NULL` for `lock` in `dma_fence_init()`, but in order to allow this patch to be backportable use an external lock.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: chemical: atlas-sensor: use iio_trigger_poll_nested() to fix remove UAF The atlas driver requests its hardware data-ready IRQ with devm_request_threaded_irq(); its threaded handler queues an irq_work, atlas_work_handler(), that calls iio_trigger_poll(data->trig). The IRQ is devm-managed, so free_irq() runs from the devres unwind after atlas_remove() returns without flushing that irq_work. Once a buffer is enabled, conversion-complete IRQs keep firing and queueing it; a pending irq_work can therefore run after the unwind has freed atlas_data/indio_dev and the trigger, when atlas_work_handler() derives the atlas_data pointer via container_of() and dereferences data->trig, a use-after-free. Call iio_trigger_poll_nested() directly from the threaded handler instead of bouncing through irq_work. free_irq() then drains the threaded handler, closing the window; other iio drivers with a threaded data-ready IRQ do the same (e.g. bmi270). This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: nVMX: Always flush vpid02 on first use Make sure vpid02 is always flushed on first use by setting last_vpid=0 when allocating vpid02. nested_vmx_transition_tlb_flush() will always detect a VPID change on first VM-Enter after VMXON, because VPID=0 in vmcs12 is not allowed if L1 enables VPID. This avoids using stale TLB entries from a previous lifetime of the VPID, that might have been associated with a different vCPU (or a completely different VM). Note that last_vpid is already being initialized as 0 when the vCPU is created, but it is not reset when vpid02 is freed on VMXOFF. Hence, the problem can only occur if L1 does VMXOFF -> VMXON, runs an L2, and KVM happens to reuse a VPID that has TLB entries on the physical CPU.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: nVM: Ensure INVVPID is emulated on the correct physical CPU When emulating INVVPID, KVM executes INVVPID on the physical CPU using vpid02 (instead of the L1 assigned VPID), after doing some validations on the operands. However, it is possible that the physical CPU KVM executes INVVPID on is different from the CPU L2 is running on. For example, in the following scenario: - L2 runs on CPU #1 and exits to L1 (vmx->nested.vmcs02.cpu=1) - L1 migrates to CPU #2 and executes INVVPID - KVM executes INVVPID on CPU #2 - L1 migrates back to CPU #1 and runs L2 (vmx->nested.vmcs02.cpu=1) The TLB entries on CPU #1 are never invalidated, because INVVPID was executed on CPU #2, and vmcs02 never ran on a different pCPU (i.e. vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs() will *not* request KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH). Ensure that INVVPID is being executed on the same pCPU that L2 last ran on, and if not, fallback to clearing last_vpid=0 to trigger a full VPID flush on the next nested VM-Enter (as KVM will detect L1 using a different VPID for L2). If L2 ends up running on a different pCPU, KVM will flush the TLB anyway through vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86/mmu: Consume the locked rmap value in the lockless rmap walk __kvm_rmap_lock() deliberately elides the rmap lock when it observes an empty rmap. In that case kvm_rmap_lock_readonly() also re-enables preemption and returns zero, so the caller holds neither the rmap lock nor a preemption reference. The elision documents the invariant it relies on: * Elide the lock if the rmap is empty, as lockless walkers (read-only * mode) don't need to (and can't) walk an empty rmap, nor can they add * entries to the rmap. I.e. the only paths that process empty rmaps * do so while holding mmu_lock for write, and are mutually exclusive. kvm_rmap_age_gfn_range() ignores the returned value and unconditionally enters for_each_rmap_spte_lockless(). The iterator started with rmap_get_first(), which re-reads rmap_head->val rather than using the value returned by the lock. If a writer populates the rmap between the lock's read and the iterator's re-read, the aging path walks the newly installed rmap without holding its lock. For a KVM_RMAP_MANY rmap this leaves the walker following a pte_list_desc chain that it never locked. A writer holding mmu_lock for write may free that chain (e.g. kvm_zap_all_rmap_sptes() on the recycle path, or any rmap zap) via kmem_cache_free() while the walk is in progress, giving a slab use-after-free. Nothing serialises the two: the aging path runs without mmu_lock when CONFIG_KVM_MMU_LOCKLESS_AGING=y, and the rmap lock that would otherwise exclude the writer was elided. Because the empty path re-enables preemption, the interval between the two reads can span an arbitrary scheduling delay. Fix the class of bug by having the lockless walk consume the value returned by the lock instead of re-reading the rmap. Split rmap_get_first() into __rmap_get_first(), which starts an iterator from an already-read rmap value, and make for_each_rmap_spte_lockless() take that value and call __rmap_get_first() directly. kvm_rmap_age_gfn_range() passes the value returned by kvm_rmap_lock_readonly(): when the lock was elided the value is zero, __rmap_get_first() returns NULL, and the walk is skipped. No lockless walker re-reads the rmap, so the lock-elision invariant cannot be violated, and no lock()-without-paired-unlock() path is added to the aging code.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86: hyper-v: Clamp stimer deadline to avoid livelock Fix an issue where userspace or the guest can program an Hyper-V synthetic timer to have a deadline in the past via integer overflow, preventing the CPU from making progress and triggering an RCU stall. Hyper-V's SynIC exposes 4 per-vCPU synthetic timers to the guest, which are emulated by KVM. Each is programmed through the HV_X64_MSR_STIMERi_CONFIG and HV_X64_MSR_STIMERi_COUNT MSRs. Depending on CONFIG, COUNT represents either the absolute expiration time or the period of a periodic timer, both expressed in 100ns ticks. These timers may be set both by the guest (WRMSR) and the host (KVM_SET_MSRS). When the timer is enabled, stimer_start() translates COUNT to an absolute monotonic deadline and arms an hrtimer. If COUNT is set to a value close to U64_MAX, the deadline calculation can overflow. ktime_add_ns(ktime_now, 100 * (stimer->exp_time - time_now)) This can result in a CPU livelock. stimer_start() arms the timer via hrtimer_start() with a deadline in the past, which causes it to immediately fire. The stimer callback then raises KVM_RQ_HV_STIMER, with the intention of causing KVM to deliver a synthetic interrupt on the next vCPU guest enter. Then, once userspace issues KVM_RUN, vcpu_enter_guest() consumes the request, calling kvm_hv_process_stimers(). This would normally disable the timer via stimer_expiration() once the deadline is in the past. However, the deadline comparison is done between the KVM reference counter and stime->exp_time, which is a big value close to U64_MAX, so this never happens for a few thousand years. kvm_hv_process_timers() then re-arms the timer via stimer_start(), since it was not disabled, which again fires immediately. Before entering the guest, kvm_vcpu_exit_request() checks kvm_request_pending(), which returns true due to the newly raised KVM_REQ_HV_STIMER. Then vcpu_enter_guest() aborts the guest entry, returning early into vcpu_run(), which loops back again into vcpu_enter_guest(), restarting the cycle. Since there are no manual yields in this loop, a task with SCHED_FIFO may starve RCU grace-period kthreads, which exposes the stalls found by syzcaller: rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: rcu: (detected by 1, t=10502 jiffies, g=14269, q=1142 ncpus=2) rcu: All QSes seen, last rcu_preempt kthread activity 10500 (4294965239-4294954739), jiffies_till_next_fqs=1, root ->qsmask 0x0 rcu: rcu_preempt kthread starved for 10500 jiffies! g14269 f0x2 RCU_GP_WAIT_FQS(5) ->state=0x0 ->cpu=0 rcu: Unless rcu_preempt kthread gets sufficient CPU time, OOM is now expected behavior. ( ... ) Call Trace: <IRQ> __run_hrtimer kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1773 [inline] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x408/0xc30 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1841 hrtimer_interrupt+0x45b/0xaa0 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1903 local_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1045 [inline] __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x102/0x3e0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1062 instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1056 [inline] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa1/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1056 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:697 RIP: 0010:__raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:152 [inline] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xa8/0x110 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:194 Code: 74 05 e8 0b f4 5f f6 48 c7 44 24 20 00 00 00 00 9c 8f 44 24 20 f6 44 24 21 02 75 4f f7 c3 00 02 00 00 74 01 fb bf 01 00 00 00 <e8> 23 6b 27 f6 65 8b 05 7c 60 5a 07 85 c0 74 40 48 c7 04 24 0e 36 RSP: 0018:ffffc900040a7320 EFLAGS: 00000206 RAX: 5de15cb931505900 RBX: 0000000000000a06 RCX: 5de15cb931505900 RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: ffffffff8daa9dc3 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: ffffc900040a73b0 R08: ffffffff8fc3d0 ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: s390: Take srcu when importing watchpoint data __import_wp_info() backs up the original guest memory contents of a watchpoint with read_guest_abs(), which is kvm_read_guest() and therefore resolves the memslot via __kvm_memslots(). That requires kvm->srcu (or kvm->slots_lock) to be held, otherwise a concurrent memslot update can free the memslots array under us once its SRCU grace period has elapsed. As this is not fast path, following lock ordering (mutex first, then srcu) take the big hammer and hold the srcu for the full import.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: s390: Fix memory corruption by not reinjecting CK machine checks Channel-subsystem damage machine checks are for the host channel subsystem. The guest channel subsystem is emulated in the userspace VMM. There is no point in forwarding such machine checks into the guest. This also simplifies the machine check reinjection and avoids kfree of a stack variable as reported by sashiko. There might be still machine checks that have the ck bit set with another bit (like instruction damage), mask out the CK bit in s390_backup_mcck_info(), like the CP and ED bits already are.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: s390: keyop: use mmu_lock to read gmap->asce Every other dat_* consumer in this file (kvm_s390_get_skeys, set_skeys, get_cmma_bits, set_cmma_bits, MEM_CLR_CMMA, kvm_s390_fixup_prefix, kvm_test_age_gfn, kvm_age_gfn) reads kvm->arch.gmap->asce *inside* the mmu_lock read-side. keyop is the only outlier. gmap->asce is mutated under write_lock(mmu_lock) by gmap_set_limit() and keyop might use a stale asce value for walking as KVM_S390_KEYOP and KVM_S390_VM_MEM_LIMIT_SIZE can run concurrently. This can result in memory corruption.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: vgic-v3: take an LPI reference in vgic_v3_save_pending_tables vgic_v3_save_pending_tables() iterates dist->lpi_xa using xa_for_each() and dereferences the returned struct vgic_irq in the loop body without holding a reference on the LPI. The xarray iterator only provides temporary RCU coverage while looking up the current entry. That is not sufficient for this loop body, which reads fields from struct vgic_irq and performs guest memory accesses before the iteration completes. A concurrent path can trigger this race: the irqfd cached injection path (vgic_its_inject_cached_translation) obtains a transient LPI reference via vgic_its_check_cache() without holding kvm->lock, vcpu->mutex, config_lock, or its_lock. If guest ITS DISCARD then drops the cache and ITE references under its_lock, the transient inject reference may become the final one. When vgic_put_irq() drops it, the LPI is erased from lpi_xa and freed via kfree_rcu(). Meanwhile, vgic_v3_save_pending_tables() may still hold a stale pointer obtained from the xarray iterator and dereference it after the RCU grace period completes. Fix this by re-fetching each iterated LPI via vgic_get_irq(), which takes a stable reference, and dropping it with vgic_put_irq() on all paths. This matches the pattern already used by other lpi_xa iterators in the vgic ITS code.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: vgic-its: Don't dereference a NULL collection on ITT save MAPC with V=0 drops ite->collection but leaves the ITE on the device's ITT list, and vgic_its_save_ite() dereferences it unconditionally. A guest that issues MAPD, MAPTI and then MAPC(V=0) therefore oopses the host when the VMM issues KVM_DEV_ARM_ITS_SAVE_TABLES to migrate it. That sequence is UNPREDICTABLE per the architecture, but KVM already handles the resulting state in the translate, MOVI and DISCARD paths. Save a zeroed entry, which vgic_its_restore_ite() reads back as invalid. Skipping the ITE instead would leave the ITT slot holding whatever is in guest memory, and restore rejects an entry naming a collection the restored collection table does not have.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: Correctly cap TLBI Range to the architural limit TLB Invalidation by Range has a fairly powerful way of encoding pretty large ranges in a small number of bits. This range can be based on an arbitrary VA, which means it is pretty easy for a guest to generate an overflow should the hypervisor be naive enough to add the range to the base... Make sure the range is capped to the limit dictated by the address bit that determines the VA range. For an IPA invalidation, this is further corrected down the line to ignore the upper range.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: LoongArch: KVM: Fix uninitialized stack variable issue with dmsintc Variable vector[] is declared on stack in function dmsintc_inject_irq() and sometimes it is used without initialized. Here fix this issue.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: LoongArch: KVM: Preserve memslot arch flags on KVM_MR_FLAGS_ONLY kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region() computes new->arch.flags, i.e. whether a memslot is KVM_MEM_HUGEPAGE_CAPABLE or KVM_MEM_HUGEPAGE_INCAPABLE, only for KVM_MR_CREATE and KVM_MR_MOVE, and returns early for every other change. But the generic code allocates a zeroed memslot for every change and never copies old->arch, so after a KVM_MR_FLAGS_ONLY update, e.g. toggling KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES for live migration, the active memslot has arch.flags == 0. With both flags clear, fault_supports_huge_mapping() falls through to the alignment check on the HVA range alone, which no longer verifies that the GPA and HVA have the same offset within a PMD. A memslot that was marked KVM_MEM_HUGEPAGE_INCAPABLE because of a GPA/HVA offset mismatch can then be mapped with PMD entries on read faults, and since kvm_map_page() aligns the gfn and the pfn independently, the guest ends up accessing the wrong host pages, exactly the "d -> f, e -> g" case described in the comment above the check. Carry the arch flags over from the old memslot for KVM_MR_FLAGS_ONLY, as the GPA, HVA and size are guaranteed to be unchanged for that case.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: LoongArch: KVM: Validate MSI data before routing it to EIOINTC pch_msi_set_irq() passes e->msi.data straight into eiointc_set_irq() as the irq number. The MSI data comes from userspace, that either via a KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_MSI entry set with KVM_SET_GSI_ROUTING (used by irqfd and KVM_IRQ_LINE) or directly via KVM_SIGNAL_MSI, and is never checked against EIOINTC_IRQS. eiointc_set_irq() uses the value with __set_bit()/__clear_bit() on the 256-bit isr bitmap, eiointc_update_irq() then indexes sw_coremap[] and the per-cpu coreisr/sw_coreisr bitmaps with it. Therefore a data value >= 256 reads and writes memory past the end of those arrays, i.e. any process holding a VM fd can corrupt kernel memory beyond the allocation of loongarch_eiointc. Reject MSI data that doesn't fit in the EIOINTC irq space. The DMSINTC path is unaffected as it decodes the vector from the address and masks it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: LoongArch: BPF: Refactor jump offset calculation in tail call The old macro-based jmp_offset calculation derives the jump distance from a stale prior-pass code stride, which can lead to wrong branch offsets and soft lockups under extra JIT passes. Fix this by calculating the offset directly on the absolute target: "ctx->offset[insn + 1] - ctx->idx". To avoid a false 16-bit range check abort during size estimation, add a "ctx->image == NULL" guard to inject a safe dummy offset.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: LoongArch: Fix acpi_package_ids[] array overflow With LoongArch virt machine, a typical setting is one core per socket, there will max 256 sockets (packages) on one VM. With PPTT acpi table, array acpi_package_ids[] will be overflowed. Here change the array size of acpi_package_ids[] with the max value of MAX_PACKAGES and KVM_MAX_VCPUS.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: LoongArch: Do not save/restore percpu base register in rethook trampoline The rethook trampoline saves $r21 ($u0), the percpu base, into its frame at entry and restores it at exit. Inbetween rethook_trampoline_handler() may schedule via preempt_enable_notrace(). If the task migrates to another CPU, the frame's $r21 holds the old CPU's percpu base, and restoring it poisons $r21 on the new CPU. Until the next user->kernel transition heals $r21, all this_cpu_*() accesses (runqueues, RCU per-CPU data, timer tick programming, FPU ownership) hit the wrong CPU's percpu area. Under kretprobe-heavy preemptible load this can corrupt scheduler and timer state: scheduling-while-atomic splats, wrong-CPU RCU warnings, WARN_ON_ONCE(rq != this_rq()) in nohz_balance_exit_idle(), and CPUs parking in the idle loop with the constant timer never re-armed (hard lockup). Reproduces on a Loongson-3A6000 with kretprobes on VFS paths plus heavy file churn (OS install / unsquashfs). By convention $r21 always holds the current CPU's percpu base in kernel mode: SAVE_SOME() at exception entry reloads it only when coming from user mode, and RESTORE_SOME() restores it only when returning to user mode; the context-switch path never writes it. Therefore the live $r21 at trampoline exit is already correct, and nothing inbetween can change it legitimately (kernel C code cannot write a global register variable). The same flaw existed even in the pre-rethook kretprobe trampoline since v6.3; it was carried over when rethook replaced it. Drop both the save and the restore here. Drop the restore is enough to solve the issue, and drop the save is to keep the code tidy and no need to clear it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: LoongArch: Avoid preempt count underflow without probe LoongArch uses break 11 for the breakpoint placed after an instruction that Kprobes executes out of line. Since userspace can issue the same break instruction, do_bp() can reach kprobe_singlestep_handler() when there is no current probe. The handler actually returns false in this case, but it first calls preempt_enable_no_resched(). The corresponding preempt_disable() is done by kprobe_breakpoint_handler() on a real Kprobe hit, so it has not run here. As a result, an ordinary userspace breakpoint (code 11) underflows the current task's preempt count. This also makes in_interrupt() return true until the task schedules. One visible consequence is the socket cgroup attribution: cgroup_sk_alloc() treats the allocation as interrupt context and assigns the socket to the root cgroup. A socket opened from the SIGTRAP handler can then avoid a BPF_CGROUP_INET_SOCK_CREATE policy attached to the task's own cgroup. Return as soon as kprobe_running() reports no active probe. The same check has appeared in [PATCH v10 2/4] of the original LoongArch Kprobes series, but was dropped before the feature reached mainline.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: cec: disable delayed work before freeing an interrupted transmit cec_transmit_msg_fh() drops adap->lock to wait for a blocking transmit in wait_for_completion_killable(). If that wait is interrupted by a signal, cancel_delayed_work_sync() can run before the CEC kthread arms the reply timeout via schedule_delayed_work(&data->work) in cec_transmit_done_ts(). The work is then armed after the cancel, and the data is freed with its delayed_work still pending: ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object: ... hint: cec_wait_timeout Use disable_delayed_work_sync(): it cancels the work and disables it, so the later schedule_delayed_work() becomes a no-op and the work cannot be re-armed. The data is freed right after, so it need not be re-enabled.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: cec: extron-da-hd-4k-plus: add sanity check Add check to prevent overflowing msg.msg[] in case the incoming data is malformed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: cec: Serialize exclusive follower delivery cec_receive_notify() reads the exclusive follower pointer without the adapter lock. Serialize the no-follower check and message delivery against mode changes and release.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: cx231xx: reject geometry changes while the VBI queue is busy vidioc_s_fmt_vid_cap() and vidioc_s_std() change the device-wide dev->width / dev->norm but only refuse the change when the *video* queue (dev->vidq) is busy. The VBI queue (dev->vbiq) shares that same geometry: cx231xx_init_vbi_isoc() latches dma_q->lines_per_field from dev->norm, the VBI videobuf2 plane is sized from dev->width / dev->norm in vbi_queue_setup() and vbi_buf_prepare(), and cx231xx_do_vbi_copy() then recomputes the destination offset from the *live* dev->width and the latched lines_per_field on every URB completion: offset = lines_completed * (dev->width << 1) + ...; if (dma_q->current_field == 2) offset += dev->width * 2 * dma_q->lines_per_field; memcpy(plane + offset, p_buffer, lencopy); Because the VBI node shares video_ioctl_ops with the video node, an application can size a small VBI plane (REQBUFS/QBUF with a small width, or with the NTSC standard), then enlarge dev->width (or switch dev->norm to PAL) through the video node while the VBI stream is running -- the change is allowed because only dev->vidq is checked -- and let the device deliver a field-2 VBI payload. cx231xx_do_vbi_copy() now computes the offset with the larger geometry and memcpy()s past the end of the smaller plane that was already allocated, a heap out-of-bounds write whose offset is attacker-chosen and whose contents come from the device. The per-field guard in cx231xx_copy_vbi_line() does not help: it bounds the copy against the latched lines_per_field, not the plane's real capacity, and vb2 does not re-run buf_prepare() for an already prepared buffer. Refuse the format/standard change when the VBI queue is busy as well, so the geometry cannot change underneath an allocated VBI buffer.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: cx23885: cancel NetUP CI work before teardown netup_ci_exit() frees a netup_ci_state while its work item, netup_read_ci_status(), may still be pending or running on the system workqueue. The worker obtains the state with container_of() and dereferences it, so it must not outlive the state. netup_ci_init() queues the initial status read, and CI GPIO interrupts subsequently queue the same work from netup_ci_slot_status(). During remove, cx23885_finidev() calls free_irq() before the CI device is unregistered. free_irq() prevents further IRQ handlers from running, but does not drain work queued previously, so the worker can run after netup_ci_exit() frees the state. Call cancel_work_sync() before dvb_ca_en50221_release() and kfree(). This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: go7007: defer the ALSA v4l2 put until card release go7007_snd_init() already takes a v4l2_device reference for the ALSA side, but go7007_snd_remove() drops it immediately after calling snd_card_free_when_closed(). That is too early when a userspace process still has the capture PCM open. The ALSA card and its PCM callbacks remain alive until the last file is closed, so the release path can still reach struct go7007 through pcm->private_data and call go7007_snd_hw_free() after the V4L2 release path has freed the object. Move the matching v4l2_device_put() to the ALSA card private_free callback so the existing ALSA reference covers the whole deferred card lifetime.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: i2c: ov02a10: fix endpoint parsing use-after-free The ov02a10_check_hwcfg() function calls fwnode_handle_put(ep) immediately after allocating and parsing the endpoint. However, it subsequently calls fwnode_property_read_u32() using the same 'ep' handle, leading to a potential use-after-free. Additionally, reading the optional 'ovti,mipi-clock-voltage' property used to overwrite the 'ret' variable. If the property was missing, 'ret' would become negative, and this failure code would be incorrectly returned at the end of the function, causing probe to fail entirely. Fix the use-after-free by moving fwnode_property_read_u32() before the endpoint is parsed and freed. Avoid the error leak by not assigning the result of fwnode_property_read_u32() to 'ret'.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: i2c: ov7740: fix use-after-destroy in remove The ov7740_remove() function had a severe teardown order bug where it destroyed the driver's mutex before freeing the V4L2 control handler which relies on that mutex, leading to a use-after-destroy kernel panic. Furthermore, the driver explicitly called v4l2_ctrl_handler_free() and mutex_destroy() sequentially, but then called ov7740_free_controls() which invokes both of them a second time, resulting in a double-free. This patch fixes the issue by unregistering the subdevice first, and relying exclusively on ov7740_free_controls() to safely tear down the mutex and control handler in the correct order.